The Outlines of the City (Part 1)
Verum-Factum and The Leviathan
Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico first presented his famous verum-factum principle in his 1710 book On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians. He wrote, "For the Latins, verum (the true) and factum (what is made) are interchangeable, or to use the customary language of the Schools, they are convertible." (1) That is, the Latin words for "true" and "what is made" are synonyms; they hold the same meaning.
The fact that they are no longer used as synonyms—that they now hold separate and distinct meanings—is a hint that we have forgotten what once made them interchangeable. This connection was already forgotten in Vico's time, necessitating his reminder.
Vico’s move toward the past, i.e., toward a time when the concepts were not yet separated, holds an implicit critique of intellectual progress. Humanity naturally separates concepts as it progresses conceptually, thereby illuminating the differences between two things that were previously understood to be one. But Vico warns that we must not simultaneously forget the similarities that were so evident before the separation. Although the differentiation garners our attention, the harmony remains.
Optimistic and Pessimistic Conclusions
This rediscovery implies one can only truly know what is made, and that one cannot know what he cannot make. Therefore, the creator is the only one who knows all. Vico continues, "Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the ancient sages of Italy entertained the following beliefs about the truth. 'The truth is precisely what is made.' And therefore, the first truth is in God because God is the first Maker; this first truth is infinite because he is the maker of all things; it is the complete truth because it represents to Him all the elements of things, both external and internal, since He contains them." (2) If the essence of the created, in its totality, is only known to the creator, God knows all because he made all. He was the initial cause and therefore is the only one to know all his effects. Any attempt to know all by another will surely be met with the same response as poor Job: "Where were you when I laid the earth's foundation?" (3) As Job did not create, he cannot know. This fate is not unique to Job, but is held by all humanity.
Job is implicit in Vico when the philosopher applies the verum-factum principle to human knowledge. He states, “For God reads all the elements of things whether inner or out, because He contains and disposes them in order, whereas the human mind, because it is limited and external to everything else that is not itself is confined to the outside edges of things only and, hence, can never gather them all together. For this very reason it can indeed think about reality, but it can not understand it fully. On that account, the human mind partakes of reason, but does not possess it fully.” (4) The religious pessimist is never far from a reference to Job. One may conclude ther is no biblical text more pessimistic than Job, and therefore no principle more pessimistic than verum-factum. But there is a hidden optimism in both.
The optimistic lesson shows itself when one observes that humanity can hold knowledge of the limited things that it has made or can make. It is here we turn to Leo Strauss, with whom we will remain for the rest of this essay series.
In the autumn of 1963, Leo Strauss gave a course on Vico at the University of Chicago. In the course, Strauss is encouraged by the possibility of knowing the true nature of the city in its entirety—something that is continued in his 1964 book The City and Man. In the transcript of the course, he begins his discussion of the verum-factum principle by noting that knowledge itself is made, and therefore can be understood. But he arrives at an issue quickly after, saying, “here is the difficulty: Do we really know how natural things are made? And the prudent answer seems to be that we do not know. It's a mystery. So then there cannot be knowledge of natural things because we do not know their making; we can only have hypotheses about them.” (5) If Vico's principle is properly understood, this is true. And this truth may be potentially distressing to a physicist or biologist, but Strauss is neither. He is a political philosopher, and Vico's principle is as encouraging to the student of politics or mathematics as it is distressing to the student of physics or biology. Why? Strauss continues, “because we have made that big leviathan.” (6)
Strauss’ Aspiration and Justification
In Strauss' The City and Man (1962), a distinction between the nature of the city or political community and the nature of man is apparent from the title alone. As Strauss stated in his lecture on Vico, the city is by convention ("we have made that big leviathan"). Man, of course, is by nature. (7) But this essay series focuses only on the city. It asks: What is the city? The audacity to ask this question rests on the assumptions that (1) we can know what is man-made, and (2) the city is man-made.
Strauss shares this aspiration and does so conspicuously. In The City and Man, he states it outright almost immediately. “It is not sufficient for everyone to obey and to listen to the Divine message of the City of Righteousness, the Faithful City. (8) In order to propagate that message among the heath, nay, in order to understand it as clearly and as fully as is humanly possible, one must also consider to what extent man could discern the outlines of that City if left to himself, to the proper exercise of his own powers.” (9)
But Strauss speaks by way of justification. Why is a justification necesarry? It is so because philosophy threatens, and is threatened by, that which can use force against it, i.e., the city. The keen reader of Strauss soon learns that the very nature of the city is opposed to philosophy. The city requires force and piety; philosophy requires their absence. But for what purpose must the philosopher justify himself? So that he may think, of course. Man must think because the most authoritative opinions (i.e., the law) are self-contradictory, (10) and the decisions we make are too important to be left to an incomplete worldly authority. In this instance, Strauss will attempt to discern the outlines of the city using only human facilities (philosophy) as opposed to the remnants of divine revelation (piety). This essay series shares that purpose.
Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians (Cornell, 1988) 45
Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians (Cornell, 1988) 46
Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians (Cornell, 1988) 46
Strauss, Vico (1963)
Strauss, The City & Man (1963) On Aristotle’s Politics ¶ 1
Strauss, The City & Man (1963) Introduction ¶ 2
Strauss, The City & Man (1963). On Aristotle’s Politics ¶ 8
