American Grand Strategy

These are notes from a class given by Professor John J. Mearsheimer this past winter. His personal website can be found here. I separated my notes into two categories: historical and conceptual. The following is only conceptual, although some overlap is unavoidable. I may return with the historical notes at another time, although those notes are less useful as the information is easily found elsewhere. 

When thinking conceptually, Mearsheimer uses the analogy of thinking at 120,000, 60,000, 30,000, or 15,000 feet. The higher you go, the more abstract the thinking. But important decisions are made at each level. The potential grand strategies, for example, are decisions made at 60,000 feet. But, the choice of grand strategy will influence the choices of friends and enemies (30,000 feet), which will eventually influence battle tactics and the development of technology, among other things (15,000 feet). The conceptual notes are organized according to these categories.

120,000 Feet: Polarity and Great Powers

I had originally been interested in the relationship between Mearshiemer’s work and that of The Sovereign Individual. There is significant overlap on subject but notable differences on method. Both examine the factors that dictate the strength and capabilities of political and military organizations, as well as the relationships between those organizations. In this class, Mearsheimer focused exclusively on the military instrument, while the SI authors covered military and economic factors. Notably, the SI authors put great emphasis on technology while Mearsheimer puts comparatively little. This difference is likely due to Mearsheimers’ exclusion of economic matters. 

The difference becomes clearer when identifying the causal factors of each theorist: Mearsheimer focuses on the effects of geopolitical conditions, but the SI authors introduce the term “megapolitical,” which broadens their scope. This term allows the SI authors to examine the factors that create political power dynamics beyond wealth and military power. Still, the focus on megapolitics may also have led them to underestimate the timeless importance of classical warfare. Mearsheimer makes no such mistake. 

Great Powers

The building blocks of great powers are wealth, population size, and military power. China was not a great power during the Cold War because it lacked the necessary wealth and military power. The best measure of wealth, according to Mearsheimer, is per capita GNP. 

Dealing with other great powers requires (1) judging capabilities and intentions, (2) rank-ordering threats, and (3) weighing the trade-offs of keeping the peace vs. preventing hegemons. Capabilities are easy to judge; intentions are difficult. Mearsheimer goes as far as to say he doesn't think we can do much to judge intentions at all. 

Mearsheimer describes the 20th and 21st centuries as multipolar, then bipolar, then unipolar, and now multipolar again. The world was multipolar prior to WWII, which had five or six great powers, depending on how you counted Italy. It was then bipolar after WWII and through the cold war—as the US and USSR both became nuclear powers, and then we entered the unipolar moment after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This unipolar moment lasted until about 2017, when we re-entered a multipolar world marked by the US, China, and Russia. There is some debate about whether Russia should be considered a global power. Mearsheimer is adamant that it should be included, but as the weakest of the three. Ultimately, global powers can be defined in multiple ways, some definitions may include Russia, and some may not. 

There are two primary means by which power distribution can change: (1) through great power wars, and (2) economic development. World War II, for example, devastated Germany, preventing it from ever regaining its status as a great power. Similarly, Japan was also destroyed by the war and has not been considered a great power since. This shift from multi-polarity to bi-polarity occurred due to the war. Alternatively, power distribution can also be influenced by economic growth. The Chinese, for instance, have not engaged in any major wars since 1973 and have instead focused on developing their economy. Unlike other nations that spend resources on warfare, China has been directing its resources towards becoming richer and has achieved remarkable economic growth. By prioritizing economic development, China has been steadily changing the distribution of power in the world without engaging in great power wars.

Multipolarity Today

Today there are two conflict dynamics: (1) US and Russia and (2) the US and China. Mearsheimer argues the two conflicts are more dangerous than they are generally perceived to be. We are effectively at war with Russia; they certainly understand it that way. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, gave an interview recently that said as much. And then there's the rise of China. 

Asia is more important than ever (geopolitically important, that is), and this is because the Chinese have the capability to project power. The potential for power projection bring with it the concern that the Chinese will overtake the Americans, so Asia becomes priority number one. Potential flashpoints between the US and China include the South China Sea, Taiwan. 

In 2001, Hillary said we were going to “pivot to Asia.” If you’re going to pivot to one place, you must pivot away from another. The place we were going to pivot away from, of course, was Europe. But the war in Ukraine has made that extremely difficult.

Unipolarity and the End of History

Unipolarity refers to a period in the modern state system, which occurred from 1990 to 2016, where there was only one great power, the United States. The concept of liberal hegemony, which can be seen as the End of History in practice, was a dominant ideology during this period. This ideology was discussed in various works, including two neoconservative articles: Fukuyama's "The End of History?" and Krauthammer's "The Unipolar Moment." 

Fukuyama's article argues that the world had reached the end of ideological evolution and that liberal democracy was the final form of human government. In contrast, Krauthammer's article emphasizes the immense military power of the United States during the unipolar moment, which allowed it to act as a "crusader state" and speed up the process of spreading liberal democracy. 

While unipolarity is generally considered peaceful, it depends on the strategy pursued by the unipolar power. JJM explains that there are five types of war, and while great power war is not possible under unipolarity, other types of combat can occur. The most peaceful scenario is to maintain the status quo, while an isolationist unipolar could lead to more conflict as lesser powers are free to continue their conflicts without a global policeman. 

Overall, unipolar America promoted peace in a significant way, but not necessarily for itself. However, as the state system moves towards multipolarity, with the emergence of other great powers such as China and Russia, it is uncertain whether peace will be maintained.

60,000 Feet: Grand Strategies

Generally speaking, this level should include diplomacy and economic policies. But this class focused strictly on the military aspect. 

Isolationism

Isolationism is a grand strategy that argues the United States should not engage itself militarily in anything beyond the Western hemisphere. That isn't to say that isolationists believe we shouldn't engage in trade or diplomatic negotiations with other countries, only that we shouldn't send our soldiers to fight and die there. 

The core claim of isolationism is the U.S. has no vital interests outside of the Western Hemisphere. In essence, the U.S. has no interests worth fighting for in Asia or Europe, much less any other region beyond the Americas. Why? Because the U.S. has "strategic immunity." It is consistent with realist logic. It emphasizes military preparedness and does not shy away from aggressive behavior – but only allows for military interactions within the Western Hemisphere. It recognizes that the U.S. has important, but not vital, interests abroad. It favors engaging with the broader world economy as well as diplomatically. It is congruent with an internationalist foreign policy. Many isolationists were progressives in their domestic politics. They were not reactionaries. Many feared that fighting wars in distant places would create a national security state threatening civil liberties.

The basis of strategic immunity in the 1930s is as follows: (1) Geography – two giant oceans. (2) The U.S. is a vast and powerful country. (3) Western Hemisphere is a substantial internal market. 

The following is the basis of strategic immunity after the Cold War: (1) Geography – two giant oceans, (2) the U.S. is the sole pole, and (3) the U.S. has thousands of nuclear weapons.

Possible arguments against isolationism include (1) Terrorism, (2) Nuclear proliferation, (3) Western Hemisphere is no longer a huge internal market (4) China – if it were a rival regional hegemon – would be free to roam. 

The logic behind isolationism is pretty airtight. But, it doesn't take into account the threat of another hegemony. Still, it's challenging to overcome the isolationist argument through logic alone. JJM uses the example of FDR and Pearl Harbor to show what is required to overcome isolationism. Japan did not want war with the U.S. because it was bogged down in China. Plus, the U.S. was much more powerful than Japan, and key Japanese policymakers expected Japan to lose to the U.S. Nevertheless, Japan attacked the U.S. and suffered a devastating defeat. Why? Why didn't Japan concede to U.S. demands? Why did it instead attack the U.S. at Pearl Harbor? 

They did so because the U.S. cut off their supply to several necessary raw materials and was effectively starving them out. Therefore, the "value of peace" was so low that the Japanese were willing to pursue an extremely risky strategy. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the isolationists could no longer claim that the U.S. was safe from wars beyond the Western Hemisphere, and it became clear that intervention was necessary. 

Grand Strategies

Two important points regarding grand strategy are: (1) Grand strategy can be a peace-time and a war-time concept, and (2) Different great powers face different circumstances when it comes to formulating grand strategy. 

Possible American Grand Strategies include (1) isolationism, (2) off-shore balancing, (3) selective engagement, and (4) liberal hegemony. Mearsheimer is an off-shore balancer. 

When determining a grand strategy, the core questions are as follows: (1) What Interests are Worth Fighting & Dying for? (In a fair fight!) (2) What Are the Threats to Those Interests? (3) What are the Best Military Instruments for Dealing with Those Threats? 

The answers to question one—what interests are worth fighting and dying for?—will differ, depending on which perspective one subscribes to. Possible perspectives include: (1) the realist perspective, (2) the Marxist perspective, (3) the liberal perspective, and (4) the domestic politics perspective. 

Then, we must ask the second question: What are the threats to those interests? The answers given were (1) other great powers, (2) minor powers, (3) terrorist groups, and (4) nuclear proliferation. JJM considers nuclear proliferation to be the most serious concern—noting the potential for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. 

Grand Strategy vs. Foreign Policy

According to Mearsheimer, “Grand Strategy is all about balancing a state’s most important foreign policy goals – its vital interests with the military means it has available to achieve those goals.” This is distinct from foreign policy in that it focuses entirely on military means rather than diplomacy or economic strategy. That is not to say that diplomacy or economic policies are not important—they are. Rather, including them in our analysis would constitute a foreign policy rather than a grand strategy. 

Robert Art, in his A Grand Strategy for America, defined foreign policy as follows: “To define a Nation’s foreign policy is to lay out the full range of goals that a state should seek in the world and then determine how all of the instruments of statecraft – political power, military power, economic power – should be integrated and employed to achieve those goals.” And, grand strategy: “Grand strategy, too, deals with the full range of goals that a state should seek, but it concentrates primarily on how the military instrument should be employed to achieve them.”

So, both Mearsheimer and Art separate grand strategy from foreign policy by distinguishing military strategy from diplomacy and economic policies. But, Mearsheimer’s definition of grand strategy focuses on vital interests, while Art’s definition incorporates all interests. 

Bob Art’s foreign policy goals for the US during the unipolar moment were as follows: (1) Prevent attack on the US homeland, (2) Prevent great-power Eurasian wars and security competition between them as well, (3) Preserve access to reasonably priced oil, (4) Preserve an open international economy, (5) Foster the spread of democracy & human rights, and (6) protect the global environment.

The Liberal (& Marxist) Perspective

The liberal perspective includes Fukuyama and Ikenberry, both Clinton and Bush administrations, among many others. JJM noted that no one held a more liberal foreign policy than the Bush 43 administration, which is quite interesting. 

This was the foreign policy we pursued during the Unipolar Moment, which Mearsheimer and other realists refer to as the liberal agenda. Underlying the liberal perspective is the desire to remake the world in America's image, and this is because liberalism is a universalistic ideology, as is Marxism. Liberalism claims all humanity has natural or god-given rights, and Marxism—Workers of the World Unite—includes all workers, not just those in the Soviet Union. It is because of the universal nature of the ideology that America is, as Mearsheimer would say, “running around the world and sticking its nose in everybody’s business.” It shifts our priorities from our more natural, innate desires for security and prosperity, toward more idealistic aims. 

Mearsheimer spoke of an article he wrote on borders and the international order. One of the questions he wrestled with was: What would happen if we entered a Unipolar Moment after the Soviet Union won the Cold War? What would the Soviet Union do is the only great power in the system? He answered, "my argument is that if the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, and was the sole pole, it would have acted like the United States and tried to remake the world in its own image. Because communism is a universalistic ideology. This is not a controversial point. It's not one that I thought up myself, much to my chagrin. Others made the point, as well."

So what does it mean to remake the world in America’s image? It means we want most countries to democratize, enter the international order, and integrate into the global economy. Importantly, this strategy has no priorities… because everything is a priority! The liberal hegemonists want to remake every nation in America’s image, so it is difficult to prioritize everything. 

Strategies for the “Third World” during the Cold War

The term “third-world” refers to developing countries. It was a term used during the Cold War. Keenan’s Containment was originally supposed to be perimeter defense — that is, defense everywhere. Walter Lippman’s critique of Kennan advocated for strong point defense (i.e., defending a few areas that matter). Keenan eventually agreed with Lippmann.  

The question was how the US should think about intervening in these areas, as grouping them as a third world was not helpful for US policymakers. The grouping of third-world countries varied strategically, with some countries being strategically located and some not. JJM suggested that it makes more sense to think in terms of regions for the American Grand Strategy. The lecture also mentions other regions like Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and Africa, but the only region that mattered in the third-world countries during the Cold War was NE Asia. 

Mearsheimer separated thinking on this subject into three categories: 

1. Human Rights Logic (Idealism)

Why Spread Democracy? End Mass Murder. End War. Or so the argument goes. If you believe that spreading democracy will end war and mass murder, the logic is pretty strong. Mearsheimer just doesn't believe that it's true that spreading democracy produces this effect. He argued that we're much better at overthrowing democratically elected governments than instituting them. He said, "we hardly ever succeed at turning non-democracies into democracies."

Mearsheimer was in favor of intervening in Rwanda for human rights reasons. That is because it would have been nearly cost-free and saved and helped numerous people. However, he is not in favor of intervening against a great power for human rights reasons—the costs are too high. That means the US should not intervene against Nazi Germany for human rights reasons. And it did not; it intervened for strategic reasons. 

As a realist, the most difficult theory to argue against is the Democratic Peace Theory, which follows human rights logic. Mearsheimer, as a realist, doesn't believe that DPT is valid, but it's powerful nonetheless. I.e., he would argue it is convincing or enticing (powerful) but not an accurate picture of reality (false). 

One question is: What do you do when realism and human rights logic line up? That answer is easy: intervene. And sometimes they do line up, as they did in Rwanda and Nazi Germany. The harder question is: What do you do when they don't line up? Realists say not to intervene; idealists disagree. 

Human rights logic also runs into the problem of sovereignty. A nationalist government is interested in showing that it's a sovereign government. That is, it will make its own decisions rather than simply following US orders. The US doesn't like that and does not respect sovereignty. 

1. Economic Logic (Emperialism)

The problem with economic logic is there is little economic power in the third world. By the 19th and 20th centuries, great powers no longer needed colonies. Germany, which led the WWs, had no colonies. They didn't need them. The United States has no colonies. 

The American public also does not support wars for natural resources. During the 1973 embargo on oil a couple of articles appeared that said we ought to invade Saudi Arabia. These generated a huge backlash; the argument couldn't be sold. In August of 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait. Bush 41 was President and was encouraged by Thatcher to do something, but he had to convince the American public. He had to sell the American military intervention to the American people. He tried to sell it first with oil, saying we can't let the oil fall into the hands of one person. It didn't fly. He had to use a different explanation; he went with the New World Order, and we couldn't let the invasion stand. 

1. Strategic Logic (Realism)

Concerning the Third World during the Cold War era, Mearsheimer (Stephen Walt, Stephen Van Evera, Bob Art) and his friends are (were) in favor of finite containment. These are the offshore balancers and selective engagers. Finite containment is another name for the "strong point defense" advocated for by Walter Lippman, to which Keenan eventually agreed. They argue certain regions do matter for US security and others do not. Again, that doesn't mean the US should not be involved economically or diplomatically; they should be. Finite containment only refers to military engagement. This crowd believes the Gulf, NE Asia, and Europe were relevant for US security during the Cold War. 

Global containment advocates want to go everywhere. They believe other regions matter greatly to the US. It's the opposite argument of finite containment, and these people won the debate (primarily through the domino theory). They argue we broke the back of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where the arms race began, and the Soviets couldn't keep up. Domino Theorists argued that if Vietnam fell, then Cambodia would fall, then Japan would fall, and so will others. Then, it spreads to Europe, and we live in a Communist world. This meant we had to stop Communism everywhere. 

Why did they expect dominoes to fall? (1) Resolve — if the Soviets don't quit and show they have resolve, this strengthens the communist movement. Resolve still matters immensely in wars. In Ukraine, the balance of resolve favors Russia (rather than the US). It's right next to them, and it matters to them in ways that it doesn't matter to us. (2) Credibility — If we did not stand up, we would appear weak. In Ukraine, the credibility part matters for the US right now. (3) Power — We thought that the Chinese and the Soviets were going to join forces, as they were both Communists! This sounds crazy in retrospect, but it didn't at the time. (4) Bandwagon —  Communism, like liberalism, is a universalistic ideology. That directly conflicts with national sovereignty (Works of the world unite!). They believed that Communism was stronger than nationalism; this seems to have proven untrue. Realists don't believe that states bandwagon. Instead, they balance. 

Global containment is distinct from rollback in that it can be achieved through coercion or war, while containment reaches its end only through deterrence. Joe Biden is part of the rollback crowd. 

Realism (continued)

From the realist perspective, the only areas worth fighting and dying will be real interests are Europe, East Asia, and the Gulf. Europe and East Asia are worth fighting for because that's where the great powers are, and fighting is therefore required to prevent a hegemon. The Gulf is worth fighting for because that's where the oil is. Regardless, according to the Realist perspective, the Western Hemisphere is the most important area in the world. 

Importantly, realists do not see a good reason for invading Vietnam. There are no great powers in Southeast Asia, and there is no equivalent to oil. However, now SE Asia matters with the rise of China. Vietnam has become of strategic importance, just about 50 years too late for our war in the 60s and 70s. 

Regional Hegemonies

Mearsheimer said, “People often wonder why the United States is running on God's green acres sticking its nose in everybody's business. Why is that the case? The answer is because we're a regional hegemony, we're free to roam with no real military threats in the western hemisphere.” That is, the US can pursue military operations outside of the western hemisphere because it is not at risk of conflicts within the western hemisphere (i.e., it is a hegemon). Conversely, by bringing NATO to the Russian border, we threatened their region. Mearsheimer believes this is the most important reason for the Ukraine War. 

Selective Engagement vs. Offshore Balancing

The difference between offshore balancing and selective engagement is that selective engagers believe the United States should maintain a presence in certain areas to maintain peace—to act as a pacifier. The offshore balancers only want to intervene to prevent a regional hegemon and then leave, and that should only be done if the locals can’t do so themselves. Off-shore balancers are willing to send US soldiers to fight and die to maintain peace in other regions. For example, the offshore balancers would have left Europe after the Cold War, and the selective engagers would have stayed to maintain peace. 

The strategy for offshore balancing is as follows: (1) Become a regional hegemony. (2) No other regional hegemon allowed. (3) If a potential regional hegemon appears, pursue a buck-passing strategy. (4) If buck-passing is not feasible, directly confront the threat (i.e., come onshore).

30,000 Feet: Domestic Politics; Friends & Enemies

Assessing Threats

In assessing threats, one should inquire about (1) intentions and (2) capabilities. Mearsheimer does not believe we can do much to interpret intentions and therefore focuses more on capabilities. It is part of the Tragedy of Great Power Politics that actors cannot properly assess intent and are therefore required to assume the worst.

The Domestic Politics Perspective

The domestic politics perspective views international relations from the perspective of domestic, often electoral, concerns. Mearsheimer said, "Then you get domestic politics—something like the Taiwan lobby during the Cold War or the Israel lobby today. You know, Steve Wolfe and I wrote this book about Israel often. Many people say to us, don't you understand that this book is a direct contradiction to realist theories? To which we answer yes. It's domestic politics driving the train. You see the same thing with Cuba, right? There's no way the United States can have good relations or even with normal relations with Cuba. Why is that the case? Cuban immigrants don't want to have relations with Cuba, and they matter electorally."

So, clearly, a thinker should not be limited to a single perspective—be it realism or domestic politics, etc. Mearsheimer uses multiple perspectives simultaneously to understand a given international situation.

15,000 Feet: Tactics and Technology; Nuclear Weapons

Extended Deterrence, First-strike, and Second-strike

The US has never had a no-first-use policy. If the US survival is at risk, we should and will use nuclear weapons. But, the US may use nuclear weapons when it is not even at risk. Why? Because of our policy of extended deterrence. 

The Article 5 Guarantee is a U.S. nuclear umbrella over a country with no nuclear weapons of its own. It is an agreement of extended deterrence—that is, we will defend any NATO territory from nuclear attack as if it were our own (we extend our nuclear deterrence). So, the US must be willing to use nuclear weapons on nations that did not attack it directly if those under its nuclear umbrella come under threat. 

During the cold war, the US extended deterrence to rescue France and West Germany. France didn’t trust us and has since built nuclear weapons. So did Britain. But we wouldn’t let the Germans or Japanese develop them after WWII. 

The United States is committed to extended deterrence because its allies do not have nuclear weapons, and the U.S. does not want anyone else to have them. To ensure their allies felt safe without nuclear weapons, the U.S. had to be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend them, which required first-strike capability. An example of this was West Germany, which did not have nuclear weapons, and the U.S. had to be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend them against the Soviets. Today, South Koreans and Japanese are at risk of North Korean nuclear weapons, and the same situation applies.

Massive Relationation

Massive Retaliation was a doctrine adopted by the U.S. in the 1950s. The name was half accurate: it was massive, but it was not retaliation because the U.S. had a preemptive doctrine.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)

The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) means that both sides have assured destruction capability against each other. If you are in a purely MAD world, there is no first use, but the U.S. needs first use to defend its allies.

Nuclear Escalation (Manipulation of Risk)

Manipulation of risk involves using limited use of nuclear weapons as a tool to manipulate the perceived risks of an opponent in a conflict. They are used as a threat rather than to actively harm their opponent (see “purposeful use” for an example). It is based on the assumption that the mere threat of using nuclear weapons can coerce an opponent into backing down without actually needing to use them. Still, the use of nuclear weapons in any form is considered a threshold that should not be crossed, as it can trigger an uncontrollable escalation leading to catastrophic consequences.

Manipulation of Risk — two forms: 

1. Purposeful Use — purposely use 3 or 4 nuclear weapons to throw both sides on the slippery slope, and then you tell the other side: if you don’t call off the dogs, I’m going to send 3 or 4 more. There’s a cliff out there, and you don’t know where the cliff is, but we’re gonna fall off eventually. We don’t know what nuclear escalation looks like. The last chance to avoid Armageddon falls with the opponent, and it relies on them to avoid Armageddon. 

2. Inadvertent Use — one side structures its forces so that there is a reasonable chance things will go wrong. This strategy is used to threaten the opponent in a manner of deliberate unpredictability. 

Nuclear Strategies & Situations

Nuclear Superiority comes in two ways: Nuclear monopoly and Splendid First Strike. Nuclear monopoly is the simplest situation, where one side has nuclear weapons and the other does not. In the Ukrainian War, Russia had nuclear weapons, and Ukraine did not; Russia had a nuclear monopoly. 

Splendid First-Strike (SFS) refers to the ability of country A to the capability to destroy the other side’s nuclear arsenal with a first strike. It's possible for one or both sides to have this capability.

• SLBMs, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, are very hard to find, but not impossible. It requires intelligence and immense coordination. Therefore, SLBMs make the splendid first strike more difficult and risky. 

If both sides have SFS, the incentives for the first strike are enormous. JJM gives the analogy of two gunfighters in the OK Corral: Whoever draws first and quickest kills the enemy and survives. This situation is remarkably unstable. One side with SFS is still unstable because of the powerful incentive to take out the other side’s nuclear arsenal before it can be used. This is the situation for the United States and North Korea today.

Nuclear Terminology

• Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) — The United States has nuclear weapons all over the place, and they need a single plan to organize their uses. 

Counterforce and Countervalue

• Counterforce Weapons — Weapons used to attack the other side’s weapons; force to force

• Countervalue Weapons — Weapons used to attack the other side’s people and destroy their economy; force to value

The Triad

• Bombers — an aircraft designed to drop large amounts of air-to-ground weaponry onto a distant target for the purposes of debilitating the enemy's capacity to wage war. Bombers are the most vulnerable of the Triad. 

• Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — ballistic missiles with a range greater than 5,500 kilometers, primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery. These missiles are in the ground rather than in the water and, therefore, quite vulnerable. The enemy can easily detect them. 

• Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) — a ballistic missile capable of being launched from submarines. These are the least vulnerable, as they’re underwater and difficult to take out with counterforce weapons. 

The Ultimate Deterrent? Stability-Instability vs. Nuclear Revolution

Of course, costs to potential aggressors are so great, and states likely will use them if their survival is at risk. Even so, the likelihood of use does not have to be high for the deterrent to be effective, as the 10% chance of total destruction is enough to avoid conflict. Therefore, aggressors are unlikely to attack a state with a survivable nuclear deterrent. This, of course, is why states want nuclear weapons. A foreign leader said, "The reason, I believe, that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons is because it makes so much sense." That is, it is in the interest of Iranians for Iranians to have nuclear weapons. It is not in the US interest for Iranians to have nuclear weapons. 

But are Nuclear Weapons the ultimate deterrent? Maybe not, according to the stability-instability paradox. 

The Stability-Instability Paradox is when two states have nuclear weapons, and they are not likely to use them. Thus, there is tremendous stability at the nuclear level, and they are free to fight a conventional war. However, this is based on the assumption that there is no threat of escalation. This is the thought process that underlies NATO’s intervention in Ukraine. 

On the other hand, the Nuclear Revolution assumes that when two states have nuclear weapons, there will not be conventional or nuclear wars, and it relies on the assumption of escalation.

• If someone says, "it's only 5% likely the Russians use nukes." But, when the costs are so high, the likelihood is less important. Mearsheimer gives an example of a gun with 20 barrels in it, and it has one bullet in it. It is still unwise to play Russian roulette."

For example, Kenneth Waltz believed it would be a good thing if Iran had nuclear weapons. If everybody’s got the ultimate deterrent, there should be peace, right? The problem is we cannot be certain no one will use them. 

Without nuclear weapons, there is a high likelihood the Cold War would have resulted in WWIII. But, with nuclear weapons, there is a small chance of total destruction. There is no right or wrong preference. Instead, the answer depends on one's willingness to tolerate risk.