Cicero
This is a unique set of notes, as it was originally formatted for a presentation. It consists entirely of Cicero’s defense of political life (the very first section of the Republic) and the Dream of Scipio (the very last section of the Republic). Of course, this is not the entirety of the work and leaves out Cicero’s most notable contribution to political philosophy: Natural Law. It is also not a direct summary like some I’ve posted on some other books, but rather a commentary and comparison that places Cicero in contact with three other philosophers: Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates.
A Defense of Political Life
Cicero begins The Republic with a defense of political life. He wrote:
"In the present work, I have planned and undertaken a discussion of the state. To prevent the project from seeming futile, I had, at the outset, to get rid of people's scruples about entering public life. Nevertheless, if any readers are swayed by the authority of philosophers, they should pay attention for a moment and listen to men who enjoy a very great authority and reputation in the highest intellectual circles. Even if they themselves never actually governed, I still think that they did the state some service because they studied and wrote extensively about it... Nor, indeed, is there any occupation which brings human excellence closer to divine power than founding new states and preserving those already founded" (Republic 1, 12).
That is:
Without defending political life, Cicero believes a discussion of the state will seem futile. Therefore, there must have been a persuasive or influential attack on political life prior to Cicero’s writing.
He is defending political life from attacks made by philosophers (as opposed to other statesmen). It is a common theme in ancient philosophy to pin the political life (that of a statesman) against the philosophic life (that of a philosopher). The duality can be understood as synonymous with the active vs. the contemplative life, which I will refer to below.
Importantly, he acknowledges that philosophers do contribute to the state, albeit in a way that seems to be less than that of a statesman.
Cicero vs. Aristotle
The Natural Desire for Community
Cicero begins his defense by appealing to the naturalness of politics—that is, the natural compulsion to (1) do good and (2) defend the well-being of the community.
“I simply state this basic fact: nature has given to mankind such a compulsion to do good, and such a desire to defend the well-being of the community, that this force prevails over all the temptations of pleasure and ease.” (Republic I, 1)
Cicero is in agreement with Aristotle here. Both agree that the polis emerges naturally and that humanity is driven by a natural compulsion to do good.
Moral Excellence (in Word & Deed)
In a second point, Cicero is in opposition to Aristotle. The statesman argues the completion of a deed is more important than its initiation; the philosopher disagrees. This maps directly onto the distinction made earlier, as the statesman completes in action what the philosopher initiates in thought. Aristotle’s position can be seen in the following passage:
“Firstly, this activity [contemplation] is the best (since not only is the reason the best thing in us, but the object of reason is the best of knowable objects); and secondly, it is the most continuous since we can contemplate truth more continuously that we can do anything. And we think happiness has pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities” (Aristotle, Ethics Book X, Ch. 7)
Cicero responds in the following way:
“It is not enough to possess moral excellence as a kind of skill unless you put it into practice… Its most important field of practice, moreover, is in the government or state and in the achievement (in reality, not just in words) of those things which our friends in their shady nooks make such a noise about. For nothing is laid down by philosophers—nothing right and honorable at any rate—which has not been brought into being and established by those who have made up laws for states.” (Republic I, 2)
Here, Cicero claims that philosophers do not, themselves, bring right and honorable things into being. For that, they need statesmen. He argues that the statesmen complete what the philosophers only discuss. What the philosophers decide is good becomes manifest only by legislation. So, Cicero’s claim is that it is higher to complete the thing rather than only initiate it. Therefore the statesman is of higher virtue than the philosopher. He continues:
So, then, the statesman who, by official authority and legal sanctions, obliges everyone to do what barely a handful can be induced to do by philosophy lectures must take precedence over the teachers who theorize about such matters. (Republic I, 3)
Underlying his claim is an assumption that it is better to cause a greater number of people to behave virtuously rather than a smaller number and a dismissal of the means of compliance. That is, Cicero does not acknowledge that philosophers persuade their followers in word and the state compels its citizens by force. That is, Cicero argues the distinction between compelled virtuous action and persuaded virtuous action is less important than the action itself.
Cicero vs. Socrates
Next, Cicero turns his attention toward persecution, saying:
“Against these well-known and well-established principles our opponents set, first, the hardships which have to be endured in defending the state—surely a flimsy objection in the eyes of anybody alert and diligent, and one to be treated with contempt” (Republic I, 4)
Of course, the counter position here is best found in Socrates. Cicero even addresses him specifically, saying:
“Yes indeed, the cruelty of Athens toward her greatest citizens can be illustrated again and again. But the habit which started and multiplied there has also, we are told, spread to this sober, responsible country of ours. (Republic 1, 5)
He notes that he had a similar experience, although he wasn’t put to death. Importantly, he says that his misfortunes in the pubic eye did not outweigh the benefits:
“Nowadays, they regularly mention my name too; and they speak even more feelingly and affectionately about my case because they think they were spared to continue in their peaceful way of life as a result of my policy and peril… And yet my misfortunes brought more gain than pain, less vexation than glory; and the joy I derived from being missed by the good was greater than the anguish I suffered from the glee of the wicked.” (Republic 1, 6-7)
This ordeal can be compared to Socrates directly, whose daemon ordered him not to participate in politics. Socrates assumes this instruction was given because political life would have forced him to either face an earlier death or to corrupt his soul.
An excerpt from Plato’s Apology of Socrates:
It may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes, it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing but never urges me forward. This is what opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man. (Apology 31a32c).
Socrates then cites the trial of the ten generals and his interaction with the thirty tyrants.
I served as a member of the Council when you wanted to try as a body the ten generals who had failed to pick up the survivors of the naval battle. This was illegal, as you all recognized later. I was the only member of the presiding committee to oppose your doing something contrary to the laws, and I voted against it. The orators were ready to prosecute me and take me away, and your shouts were egging them on, but I thought I should run any risk on the side of law and justice rather than join you for fear of prison or death when you were engaged in an unjust course. (Apology 32bc).
Cicero vs. Plato
Finally, we arrive at Cicero’s strongest point. He addresses a claim made in Plato’s Republic. Namely, that the philosophers should be called upon to rule in a time of turmoil but should not govern otherwise. Cicero, rightly, marks this point as nonsensical.
“Our country did not give us life and nurture unconditionally, without expecting to receive its return, as it were, some maintenance from us; nor did it engage simply to serve our convenience, providing a safe haven for our leisure and a quiet place for our relaxation.” (Republic 1)
Cicero effectively addresses the debt owed to the community—the community that helped you to develop and grow, etc. But, the Socratic point is left unaddressed: Going into politics, into public life, and mixing with the general population, corrupts the virtuous person. This is Plato’s reason why the philosopher should not govern unless absolutely necessary. Cicero would say you either mix with the demos or you are ruled by it, and it’s better to mix.
Cicero continues, asking: How can the philosopher govern properly if he has not trained himself in advance? He writes:
“Again, when they deny that a wise man will take part in politics, who, I ask you, can be satisfied with the proviso—‘unless some period of crisis compels him’? As if anyone could face a greater crisis than I did. What could I have at that time had I not been consul? And how could I have been consul if I had not followed from boyhood the career that would bring a man of equestrian birth like me to the highest office? So the opportunity of rescuing the country, whatever the danger that threatens it, does not come suddenly or when you wish it, but only when you are in a position which allows you to do so.” (Republic 1, 10)
“I find this most astonishing in the writings of intellectuals: they plead their inability to steer the ship when the sea is calm because they have been taught and have never cared to acquire such knowledge, and yet they proclaim that they will take the helm when the waves are at their highest!” (Republic 1, 10)
“So what sense does it make to promise assistance to the government only if driven to do so by a crisis, when they cannot manage a much easier task, namely to take charge of a government when there is no compelling crisis?” (Republic 1, 10)
It is likely that Plato would respond along the following lines: What matters most is the virtue of the decision-maker, not the technical expertise of politics. By going into politics, by mixing with the demos, the statesman is sacrificing virtue for technical expertise. In times of crisis, virtue will be more valuable.
The Dream of Scipio
Below is Raphael's painting Vision of a Knight, believed to be a depiction of Scipio's Dream.
Earlier in the dialogue, the men discuss “celestial matters.” There is great disagreement about whether such things are worth discussing. Scipio believes Socrates was wise not to discuss celestial matters. “Holding that problems about the physical universe were either too enormous for a reason to comprehend or else quite irrelevant to human life” (Republic I, 15). Lealius initially quips, “have we, then, concluded our research on everything relevant to our homes and country, since we are now wondering about goings on in the sky?” (Republic I, 19). Still, he does not object to the discussion, “particularly as it's holiday time” (Republic I, 20).
Philus disagrees. He says that “we must remain ignorant of many important things if we are ignorant of these” (Republic I, 19). And so, Philus tells the story of Archimedes, who developed a model of the planets that could successfully predict an eclipse. Galus, owing to Archimedes' globe, was able to make a “public statement in that camp to the effect that it was not an omen; it happened then, and would continue to happen at fixed times in the future when the sun was in a position from which its light could not reach the moon” (Republic I, 23). Pericles is said to have given a similar speech during the Peloponnesian War.
This is an important point. Celestial matters are the extremes of contemplation—the type of contemplation that seems clearly does not affect human life. But, as Philus points out, contemplation of the physical world actually does affect human life(!), and this is because beliefs about these matters dictate behavior, and clarity on these matters can lead to better choices and behavior. This is so interesting because Cicero began the Republic with a prolonged defense of the political life in opposition to the philosophical life, which amounts to a defense of the practical over the contemplative. Yet, in the end, he acknowledges the importance of even the least practical forms of contemplation. Even knowledge of the position of the stars can be useful.
